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Abstract: 
This article investigates how contract employment practices adopted by universities—
fixed-term contracts and permanent contracts—impact research productivity measured 
in terms of publications in scholarly journals. The empirical application considers the 
Spanish public higher education system for the period 2002-2008. We report an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between the rate fixed-term contracts and the research 
productivity of Spanish universities. That is, contract policies based on fixed-term 
contracts are conducive to research productivity; however, beyond a critical threshold 
value increases in the proportion of fixed-term contracts are associated with declining 
research productivity. These findings reveal that contract employment policies shape 
research productivity, and that flexible and balanced contract practices are critical for 
enhancing universities’ research productivity. The results suggest that the excessive use 
of fixed-term contracts might create an unstable working environment that limits the 
universities’ capacity to capitalize on their knowledge workers. Policy implications and 
future research avenues are discussed. 
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Contract employment policy and research productivity of knowledge workers: An 
analysis of Spanish universities 
 
1. Introduction 
Governments have traditionally devoted considerable resources to finance R&D 
and scientific outcomes, either through tax policy or direct investment. The recent trend 
on the creation of a knowledge-based economy has resulted in reforms and investments 
in R&D infrastructures, including universities and research centers (European 
Commission, 2007). Additionally, the growing awareness of the importance of 
universities as key pillars for the consolidation of knowledge-based economies has led 
European governing bodies to adopt specific policies within the EU 2020 strategic plan 
aimed at stimulating knowledge creation and diffusion, as well as scientific productivity 
among universities (European Commission, 2015). 
Nevertheless, universities do not realize the generally positive effects of R&D 
investments at the same intensity (European Commission, 2013). Research 
productivity—in terms of publication metrics—is not only heterogeneous between 
universities, but also in terms of the factors explaining productivity differences over 
time. A common presumption is that both the institutional setting governing public 
universities (King, 2004) and scientists’ career incentives (Reich, 2013) play a decisive 
role in shaping universities’ scientific productivity. 
Notwithstanding the increased relevance of research productivity for policy 
makers and universities, the majority of studies analyze academics’ productivity in US 
universities whose institutional characteristics—e.g., autonomy, job mobility and 
stratification—are not representative of most European settings (see, e.g., Agarwal & 
Ohyama, 2014; Goldfarb, 2008; Lee & Bozeman, 2005). US universities enjoy full 
autonomy to recruit and promote scientists, who can both bargain their working 
conditions and search for better positions in other universities via the job market (Clark, 
1993). Also, the US system is stratified and universities can adapt scientists’ workloads 
according to the orientation of the institution (research versus teaching) (Ehrenberg, 
Kasper, & Rees, 1991). 
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The picture in Europe is quite different.
2
 While the UK university system shares 
most characteristics of the US system aforementioned, other contexts—e.g., France, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy or Spain—have a centralized system in which public 
universities cannot differentiate openly their orientation, and in which job calls are 
conditioned by governmental policy (Lissoni, Mairesse, Montobbio, & Pezzoni, 2011; 
Lutter & Schröder, 2016). Also, scientists’ working conditions are defined by national 
laws, and regulatory procedures govern recruitment and promotion processes. 
The characteristics of centralized systems arguably limit competition between 
universities for recruiting or promoting productive scientists, and reforms adopted in 
various EU countries seek to correct these flaws and improve research productivity. 
Thus, a critical question is, do universities’ contract employment policies affect research 
productivity? In Europe, studies on research productivity mostly examine the effects of 
demographic variables and industry collaborations (Balsmeier & Pellens, 2014; Breschi, 
Lissoni, & Montobbio, 2008; Lutter & Schröder, 2016), as well as the life cycle of 
research productivity (Bonaccorsi & Daraio, 2003; Hall, Mairesse, & Turner, 2007). 
The analysis of the effect of universities’ contract employment policies on research 
productivity has been largely sidelined in previous research. 
Recently, a stream of research has emphasized that research scientists are 
archetypal knowledge workers whose productivity level is affected by employment 
conditions, influence on work arrangements and the capacity to manage career 
development (Harney, Monks, Alexopoulos, Buckley, & Hogan, 2014; Lissoni et al., 
2011; Swart, 2007). The analysis of the relationship between employment practices and 
research productivity is the focus of this study. Specifically, this paper evaluates the 
impact of universities’ contract employment practices—i.e., fixed-term contracts and 
permanent contracts—on research productivity, measured via publication metrics. 
Fixed-term contracts and mobility are often invoked as a solution to the potential 
problems resulting from academic inbreeding, including lower creativity and 
productivity levels among scientists, and the development of narrower scientist 
networks (see, e.g., Horta, Veloso, & Grediaga, 2010; Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003). 
However, employment practices heavily reliant on fixed-term contracts may be 
                                                 
2 Additional qualitative information on the characteristics of public universities’ evaluation systems was 
obtained through an informal round of contacts with scholars from various European countries. For their 
valuable comments, we are indebted to Rodrigo Rabetino (University of Vaasa, Finland), László Szerb 
(University of Pécs, Hungary), Yancy Vaillant (Toulouse Business School, France) and Ferran Vendrell-
Herrero (University of Birmingham, UK). 
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detrimental to long-term career development, and increase job insecurity by preventing 
researchers from accessing employment opportunities and working conditions that are 
core to their careers (Fuller & Unwin, 2010; Harney et al., 2014). 
The empirical application considers the Spanish public university system 
between 2002 and 2008. This setting is attractive because, similar to other European 
countries, Spain underwent major reforms in the university’s regulatory framework 
seeking to make a better use of publicly funded R&D. Reforms brought about important 
challenges for universities in that they are now called to prioritize knowledge-oriented 
outputs, which led to drastic modifications in their strategic model and human resource 
management policies. Therefore, the Spanish setting offers the opportunity to analyze 
how universities match their new objectives to their contract employment practices in a 
context where scientists have strong publication incentives, and where their publishing 
incentives are potentially decoupled with the characteristics of their contracts. 
This article contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, this study looks 
into the role of contract employment practices on research productivity, answering the 
call made by Currie, Tempest, and Starkey (2006), Swart (2007) and Donnelly (2009) 
for more research on scientists’ productivity in contexts where contract practices might 
create uncertain conditions for researchers. Our results pointing to an inverse U-shaped 
effect of fixed-term contracts on research productivity suggest that universities promote 
HR structures that not always match the characteristics of the knowledge of scientists. 
In this sense, this study extends the work by Lepak and Snell (2002) by showing how 
knowledge workers—i.e., scientists—respond to different human resource practices in 
knowledge-based organizations, in our case universities. 
Second, the proposed analysis generates valuable insights with practical 
application. The analysis of the effects of contract employment on scientists’ 
productivity has increasingly drawn policy makers’ attention as a result of their interest 
in enhancing the effectiveness of the public funding of science. By examining the 
productivity outcomes that flow from different employment practices universities might 
be in a better position to understand how to capitalize on the knowledge of scientists. 
 
2. Background literature 
2.1 Human resource architecture 
Literature rooted in the strategic human resource (HR) management frame has 
mostly focused on how organizations capitalize on their knowledge stocks (Lepak & 
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Snell, 1999; Kang, Morris & Snell, 2007). Lepak and Snell (1999, 2002) proposed a 
framework, referred to as the human resource architecture, which emphasizes that the 
management of knowledge stocks embedded in employee groups within and across firm 
boundaries plays a central role in shaping value creation processes. This framework 
helps to integrate differences in knowledge and to create a picture of how a business’ 
knowledge portfolio is managed. Further work by Kang et al. (2007) incorporates in the 
analysis specific strategies that businesses can adopt to optimize the management of 
knowledge workers. Human resource architecture models suggest how businesses 
allocate and manage different types of employees depending on both the characteristics 
of their knowledge—value (potential to improve performance) and uniqueness (degree 
of replicability)—and their relationship with the organization (core employees, internal 
employees, external partners and contract workers) (Kang et al., 2007). 
Underlying HR architecture models is the assumption that business’ competitive 
advantage primarily results from the effective exploitation of the core employees’ 
knowledge base, while the knowledge of contract workers ‘is neither of particularly 
high strategic value to a firm nor unique, thus becoming prime candidates for 
outsourcing’ (Kang et al., 2007, p. 243). This implies that the value of knowledge is 
heterogeneous across employees, and that HR practices focused on the maximization of 
core employees’ knowledge have the greatest impact on business performance. 
Notwithstanding their significant contribution to the strategic HR management 
literature, HR architecture frameworks often underrate the value of contract workers on 
the basis that their knowledge and abilities are of little value and potential for the 
organization (Harney et al., 2014). As described by Kang et al. (2007), the main task of 
contract workers is to provide support to core or internal employees, which places them 
in a disadvantageous position relative to employees with permanent contracts. Although 
the validity of the approach by Kang et al. (2007), HR practices in knowledge-based 
organizations should also be aligned with specific characteristics of the work 
environment that may affect the contribution of contract workers to performance. In the 
specific context of universities this raises a number of issues of relevance to this study. 
First, differences in the business’ HR architecture mostly reflect differences in 
human capital among employees, in terms of the value and uniqueness of knowledge 
(Lepak and Snell, 2002, p. 519). In the case of universities, they employ contract 
workers on the basis that their knowledge is valuable and has the potential to enhance 
performance. Second, organizations increase the flexibility of their labor force by 
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employing contract workers who perform tasks with limited scope (Lepak and Snell, 
2002, p. 521). Nevertheless, contract workers play a key role in universities (Harney et 
al., 2014; Lissoni et al., 2011). The productivity of universities is a function of 
knowledge work in which the strong connection between scientists with permanent 
contracts and flexible contracts is critical to create knowledge outcomes and, 
consequently, enhance universities’ research productivity. 
If scientists with both permanent and temporary contracts have valuable and 
unique knowledge that can be used to increase research productivity, there are likely 
implications for the characteristics of the HR architecture. Within universities, the 
value-creating potential of young researchers’ knowledge is comparable to that of 
scientists with permanent contracts (Harney et al., 2014). This unveils a discrepancy in 
the universities’ HR practices that results from the mismatch between knowledge 
properties and the contract status afforded to fixed-term scientists. We argue that, along 
with knowledge properties (value and uniqueness), job security is a relevant dimension 
that should be accounted for in the HR practices of universities to achieve the desired 
goal of maximizing the knowledge generation process involving faculty with permanent 
and fixed-term contracts. 
 
2.2 Contract policy in universities and the research productivity of scientists 
The competitive advantage of universities heavily relies on scientists whose 
productivity stems from the exploitation of their knowledge and skills to solve novel, 
complex and abstract problems (Deem, Hylliard, & Reed, 2007; Swart, 2007). Also, 
knowledge work takes place in an environment—i.e., within universities—where the 
high interdependence of tasks promotes the strong interaction between permanent 
scientists and other knowledge workers with flexible contracts (Harney et al., 2014). 
Because academics—regardless of their contractual status—constitute a 
strategically valuable resource for universities, the development of HR management 
strategies is of paramount significance (Feng, Chen, Wang, & Chiang, 2012; Lepak & 
Snell, 1999). Echoing Kang et al. (2007), such practices in the higher education system 
should focus on the design of both flexible work structures and incentive systems that 
include pay, performance appraisal, and job security.  
Therefore, it is important to question whether universities’ HR contract practices 
align with scientists’ interests or, on contrary, whether such HR policies increase job 
insecurity and send conflicting messages to scientists that affect their productivity. Prior 
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studies indicate that factors related to independence and job security are highly valued 
by scientists (Agarwal & Ohyama, 2014; Fuller & Unwin, 2010; Harney et al., 2014). 
Any attempt to answer this question requires the clarification of two different 
but complementary issues: the definition of research productivity and the identification 
of the HR contract practices employed by universities to manage knowledge workers. 
Concerning the first issue, research productivity, existing research reveals that 
faculty promotion and tenure decisions are mostly based on faculty’s publication 
records (Lissoni et al., 2011; Quimbo & Sulabo, 2014). Thus, it is not surprising that 
scientists cater to the tastes of universities and seek to publish in scholarly journals as 
much as they can to meet the expectations. This approach to research productivity has 
resulted in HR practices—e.g., the use of journal lists in tenure, promotion and 
compensation systems—oriented to enhance universities’ research productivity by 
encouraging scientists to target journals that on average receive more citations. 
Nevertheless, the debate on what constitutes research productivity is open, and 
recent work underlines the need for adopting a holistic approach to scientists’ 
productivity (Aguinis, Shapiro, Antonacopoulou & Cummings, 2014; Bazeley, 2010). 
The main criticism to contemporaneous productivity metrics based on publication 
counts or citations is their narrow focus on a single stakeholder (i.e., academics), which 
implies that they do not provide information about impact on other stakeholders, such as 
policy makers or practitioners (Aguinis et al., 2014). Indeed, Pettigrew (2011, p. 348) 
suggests that ‘including the impact of research in the social, economic and cultural 
spheres beyond academia is an important corrective to this displacement of goals’. 
Recent technology advances have allowed the development of IT-based 
competencies—e.g., database management—that play a key role in the computation of 
more inclusive productivity measures (Aguinis et al., 2014). Yet, although scholars 
widely acknowledge the need to improve research productivity metrics, an agreement 
on what variables should be included and how to estimate productivity has not yet been 
reached. In the absence of a widely accepted definition of research productivity, policy 
makers—and, consequently, universities—in the US and Europe continue to evaluate 
scientists’ productivity using publication metrics (Berbegal-Mirabent, Lafuente, & Solé, 
2013; Lissoni et al., 2011; Lutter & Schröder, 2016; Quimbo & Sulabo, 2014). 
As for the second issue, HR policies, universities mostly employ two types of 
contracts to regulate their relationship with academics, namely, permanent contract and 
fixed-term contract (Lissoni et al., 2011). Traditionally, academics with permanent 
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contracts are public servants who possess knowledge and experience that are core to the 
university. Also, experienced scientists may have developed networks and specific 
capabilities in managing research teams which, in turn, can contribute to increase 
university performance (Ryazanova & McNamara, 2015). Concerning research 
productivity, existing work on human capital accumulation (Levin & Stephan, 1991) 
stresses that scientists’ productivity declines with age (e.g., Boardman & Ponomariov 
2007; Hall et al., 2007). In a scenario of age-driven productivity slow-downs, incentives 
to publish are likely determined by the scientists’ interest in both consolidating research 
projects and increased reputation (Balsmeier & Pellens, 2014). Thus, permanent 
scientists might compensate their potential productivity decline with activities linked to 
the training of junior researchers so that the university’s productivity is not depressed. 
Also, aged scientists may be still prolific in supporting young researchers and 
identifying promising research avenues that they do not pursue personally. 
Fixed-term contracts introduce flexibility in the universities’ HR management 
practices. Contrary to academic inbreeding, this type of contract facilitates external 
recruitment, which increases mobility of academics and favors competition (Ackers & 
Oliver, 2007; Paradeise, 2012). Scientists with a fixed-term contract are often young 
and promising researchers whose tasks are primarily oriented to produce research 
outcomes. Although its generally accepted advantages, a policy heavily based on the use 
of fixed-term contracts might generate unintended negative effects related to job 
precariousness and the poor exploitation of the university’s knowledge base (Harney et 
al., 2014). More concretely, fixed-term contracts might create job insecurity which 
materializes in short-term job offers, high turnover rates, and high levels of stress 
among academics (Bryson & Barnes, 2000; Metcalf, Rolfe, Stevens, & Weale, 2005). 
Low internal promotion opportunities resulting from HR practices that saturate 
universities with fixed-term scientists increase the number of academics with shorter 
length of service that leave the university and search for a more stable position in the 
industry (Agarwal & Ohyama, 2014; Balsmeier & Pellens, 2014; Hall et al., 2007). 
The core of our analysis is to scrutinize the effects on universities’ research 
productivity of HR contract employment practices. Based on these arguments and 
evidence we hypothesize: 
H1: The research productivity of scientists with fixed-term contracts is greater 
than that of faculty with a permanent position. 
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3. Research context: Regulatory framework and academic career in Spain 
In Spain, similar to other EU countries, the university system has gone through 
significant modifications during the past decades. Before 2001, the Organic Law of 
Universities (LRU) 11/1983 was the legal framework regulating the relationship 
between universities and faculty (permanent or fixed-term). In 2001 a profound reform 
took place, and with the enactment of the new Universities Act (LOU, 6/2001) higher 
education institutions enjoyed greater autonomy to restructure the faculty selection 
process. Also, the Spain’s Government created in 2002 the Agency for Quality 
Assessment and Accreditation Trust (ANECA) to evaluate and endorse the scientific 
activity of university researchers. Similar agencies with the same attributions were 
created in various Spanish regions. With the new regulatory frame governing the 
university system in place, faculty witnessed a significant shift in how their research 
productivity affects the development of their academic career. In this new scenario, 
universities’ research orientation is further emphasized, and the parameterization of 
research outputs facilitates the evaluation of universities and scientists (see Figure 1). 
 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Yet, upon closer inspection it turns out that publication incentives are not equally 
distributed among faculty. In the case of permanent faculty, the 2001 Universities Act 
had no impact on their publication incentives, as this law did not introduce any 
modification into the evaluation process of their scientific outputs. Despite the new 
regulation, the number of vacancies for new permanent faculty was predetermined by 
public authorities, being seniority a key aspect in the evaluation process. Following the 
spirit of the LOU Act of 2001, a complementary reform took place in 2007 (Reform of 
the Organic Law of Universities (RLOU) 4/2007) on the accreditation process for 
candidates to permanent (civil servant) positions. This reform brought about two main 
changes in the Spain’s system. First, the typology of permanent faculty was narrowed 
down to two (Senior Lecturer and Full Professor). Second, candidates to a permanent 
position have to undergo a more stringent evaluation process, where the positive 
assessment by ANECA—or the competent regional agency—is now critical. Although 
regulatory changes, publication incentives of permanent faculty remain low as their 
productivity is not evaluated once they obtained the position. 
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The recruitment and assessment of fixed-term faculty also experienced significant 
variations. The 2001 Universities Act introduced the position of part-time faculty, 
which includes specialists with proven professional activity outside the university who 
perform a reduced number of teaching hours and, accordingly, they are paid hourly. The 
profile of this position—qualifications and tasks—makes it that the publication 
incentives for this group are low (or non-existent). 
The RLOU Act of 2007 split the fixed-term position in three categories: assistant 
professor, PhD assistant lecturer, and PhD lecturers. For both assistant and PhD 
assistant professors the length of the contract is limited to four years. Lecturers enjoy a 
permanent contract; however, they do not have the status of civil-servant. Scientists can 
progressively move up through these three positions, provided that their merits are 
accredited by ANECA or the competent regional authority. More concretely, scientific 
publications weigh between 26% and 35% of the total evaluation.
3
 Thus, incentives to 
publish are high in these groups as a good publication record helps open the door either 
to an internal promotion within the university or to a position in another university. 
The analysis of the characteristics of the Spanish university system provides some 
insights on how HR contract employment policies might affect research productivity. 
First, similar to other EU countries with centralized university systems, reforms in the 
Spanish university system give research productivity a key role on career advancement. 
Second, the reforms introduced in 2001 resulted in the parameterization of scientists’ 
outcomes, which contributes both to interrupt career-by-seniority pathways common in 
Spain before 2001, and to create productivity incentives for young scientists. 
The characteristics of the Spanish system suggest that fixed-term scientists should 
be more productive—due to publishing pressures for career progress—than permanent 
scientists whose publication record is not subject to scrutiny. These arguments—jointly 
with the deductions coming from the theory that underpins this study (section 2)—
                                                 
3 Qualitative information provided by colleagues from various EU countries (see footnote 1 for details) 
reveals that publications are the main indicator to evaluate scientists’ productivity. However, the weight 
of research productivity in the evaluation equation is uneven across Europe. In the UK the quality of 
research outputs of schools and university departments is evaluated every six years within the Research 
Exercise Framework (REF). In the 2014 REF research outputs represented 65% of the final assessment of 
research quality of the analyzed unit (http://www.res.org.uk/details/mediabrief/5158051/EVALUATING-
RESEARCH-QUALITY-How-peer-review-panels-should-make-their-REF-assessm.html). In other 
contexts the relevance of publication records is less parameterized, and the public administration 
empowers either university departments (Finland, Germany, and Italy) or accreditation agencies 
(Hungary) to decide on the weight of research productivity in the scientists’ evaluation scorecard. 
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justify the analysis of universities’ research productivity, looking for a better 
understanding of how universities’ HR policy contribute to capitalize on their scientists. 
 
4. Data, variable definition and method 
4.1 Data 
In order to accurately analyze the connection between HR employment practices 
and the research productivity of Spanish public universities, we collected information 
from three different sources. First, the empirical analysis uses the bi-annual reports 
provided by the Spanish Association of University Rectors (Conferencia de Rectores de 
Universidades Españolas, CRUE) for the years 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. This 
organization brings together all Spanish universities and represents the main 
interlocutor between higher education institutions and the Spanish government. The 
CRUE databases contain organizational data as well as information about the 
configuration of the faculty of Spanish public universities, in terms of contractual status. 
Second, the annual reports available from the Network of Spanish Technology 
Transfer Offices (RedOTRI) are used to obtain information about the publication record 
of Spanish public universities. Note that data on scientific publications included in these 
reports were gathered from the ISI Web of Science. Third, and with the objective of 
expanding the scope of the publication record of Spanish public universities, we 
manually collected—for each university—the total number of articles published in 
scholarly journals included in the SCOPUS databases. In this case, we collected the 
information on the scientific publications of Spanish public universities by matching the 
names of the universities with the identification name of the universities as assigned by 
SCOPUS.
4
 Note that the publications indexed in SCOPUS databases include scientific 
journals, books and conference proceedings. However, given the objective of the study, 
we limited the search to scientific articles published in scholarly journals in all scientific 
fields. Although we acknowledge that publications partially measure research 
productivity (Ryazanova & McNamara, 2015), the available data allow at evaluating the 
research productivity of Spanish public universities using both quantity- and quality-
based publication metrics (Lissoni et al., 2011; Lutter & Schröder, 2016). 
                                                 
4 Because university names might appear in different ways (i.e., English and Spanish spelling) in the 
search tool available at the SCOPUS website, we double-checked the entries from the database in an 
effort to ensure that, for each university, all publications are correctly included in our dataset. 
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In this study, the unit of analysis is the public university, and the final database 
comprises information for all Spanish public universities from 2002 to 2008 (47 
universities and 188 observations). 
It should be noted that that public universities are spread across all Spanish 
regions. More concretely, Andalucia (9 universities), Catalunya (7 universities) and 
Madrid (6 universities) are the regions with the greatest number of higher education 
institutions. On contrary, nine out of the 17 Spanish regions have one university. 
Additionally, 38 public universities have a medical school, while four out of the 47 
institutions analyzed in this study are polytechnic universities. 
 
4.2 Variable definition 
Dependent variables. Similar to prior studies (e.g., Balsmeier & Pellens, 2014; 
Berbegal-Mirabent et al., 2013; Lissoni et al., 2011), the knowledge output chosen to 
analyze universities’ research productivity relates to the articles published in journals 
indexed in SCOPUS and the ISI-Web of Science. More concretely, we examine two 
dimensions of research productivity. First, a quantity-based measure defined as the total 
number of scientific articles published in academic journals—i.e., indexed in the 
SCOPUS database—divided by the total full time faculty (permanent and fixed-term 
contracts). Second, and similar to Lissoni et al. (2011) and Lutter and Schröder (2016), 
a quality-based variable measured as the number of scientific articles published in 
journals indexed in the ISI-Web of Science divided by total full time faculty. 
At this point, we discuss three important aspects related to the computation of 
the dependent variables. First, the selection of publications per faculty as a measure of 
research productivity responds to the following criteria. On the one hand, scientists seek 
to maximize the value of their human capital by generating observable knowledge 
outputs, being publications a key indicator of academic success (Agarwal & Ohyama, 
2014; Balsmeier & Pellens, 2014). On the other hand, as we indicated in section 3, the 
publication record is the most influential factor used by Spanish governmental agencies 
to evaluate the merit of scientists. 
Second, publication outputs are conditioned by time and they do not necessarily 
follow the immediate exploitation of scientists’ knowledge. For instance, researchers 
cannot control reviews and publication timing, thus creating a time span between the 
creation of the scientific article and its publication, i.e., scientists’ research efforts are 
likely observable in following periods. Ignoring this time irregularity would yield 
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biased results for research productivity. Following Lockett and Wright (2005) and 
Berbegal-Mirabent et al. (2013), we control for the time-varying relationship between 
knowledge exploitation by scientists and the observability of publication outputs. To 
achieve this, the computation of the research productivity of a focal university includes 
those papers published in period t and in the subsequent period (t+1).  
Third, it should be kept in mind that underlying our definition of research 
productivity is the assumption that permanent and fixed-term professors generate 
publications. Part-time professors are specialists with market experience whose task 
strictly relates to teach a reduced number of hours. Thus, the proposed measure of 
publications by full-time faculty—i.e., excluding part-time contracts—accurately 
captures research productivity by incorporating in the estimation full-time scientists 
whose role in the university is linked to teaching and to the creation and dissemination 
of knowledge outputs. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. 
Also, Figure 2 breaks research productivity into the two proposed measures and plots 
the average proportion of fixed-term contracts between 2002 and 2008. The figure 
shows not only the significant increase in research productivity between 2002 and 2008, 
but also the pronounced difference when compared to the pattern reported for the 
proportion of fixed-term contracts, a pattern that suggests that the employment of fixed-
term contracts by Spanish public universities has grown faster than research 
productivity during the analyzed period. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
 
Contract status. Following the spirit of the Lisbon agenda, the enactment of the 
new regulatory framework in 2001 brought about important policy challenges. In the 
new scenario, Spanish public universities have strong incentives to employ scientists 
with publication potential, an objective that is strictly related to the policy makers’ 
interest to increase the effectiveness of publicly funded science, and to measure the 
universities’ research productivity on the basis of publication metrics. This study 
focuses on the relationship between the universities’ contract employment policy and 
research productivity. The contract status of academics is measured via three variables 
which reflect the existing contract categories: the proportion of permanent faculty, 
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measured by the ratio of permanent faculty relative to total faculty; the proportion of 
fixed-term contracts, calculated as the number of fixed-term faculty divided by total 
faculty; and the proportion of part-time faculty, measured as the ratio of part-time 
faculty divided by total faculty. In all model specifications the proportion of permanent 
faculty is the base category.  
Control variables. We control for size, age, gender distribution, international 
networks, academic diversification and time in the different model specifications. 
University size is measured by the total number of faculty, while university age is 
expressed in years. Both size and age variables were logged to reduce skewness. Prior 
studies stress that gender is a non-meritocratic factor that might affect the road to 
success in academia and, consequently, university productivity (Jacob & Lefgren, 2011; 
Lutter & Schröder, 2016). To accurately assess the potential effects of the universities’ 
gender configuration on research productivity we introduced in the analysis three 
variables capturing the proportion of men in each of the faculty categories analyzed in 
the study (permanent faculty, fixed-term professors, and part-time professors). 
International co-publications are often used as a measure of research collaboration, and 
they represent a partial indicator of (successful) collaborative networks (Jonkers & 
Tijssen, 2008; Ryazanova & McNamara, 2015). Thus, we use the proportion of 
international co-publications in scientific journals as a measure of co-authorship 
networks. Note that data on international co-publications available from the RedOTRI is 
restricted to papers visible on the ISI Web of Science database. We are aware that this 
variable partially captures the effect of international networks on research productivity. 
But, because publications in journals indexed in the ISI Web of Science represent 
48.87% of the total publications during the analyzed period (see Table 1), we consider 
this variable a good proxy to measure collaborative networks. 
Also, universities choose their set of academic degrees, and decisions on the 
degree of specialization result from several considerations where economic and market 
demand factors play a role. Following McMillan and Chan (2006) and Berbegal-
Mirabent et al. (2013), we computed a Herfindahl index (HHI) for each university and 
in each period to control for the universities’ academic diversification. The degrees 
offered by Spanish public universities are grouped into five categories: humanities 
studies, social sciences, natural sciences, medical sciences, and engineering studies. For 
ease of interpretation, we subtract the index from one, reversing the scale of this 
variable so that academic diversification increases as the index approaches one. Finally, 
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we included a set of dummy variables to rule out the potential effect of time trends and 
other environmental changes (in all models 2008 was excluded as the base year). 
 
4.3 Methods 
In line with the arguments that underpin this study, we employ panel data 
techniques to estimate the proposed model which emphasizes a relationship between 
research productivity and the contract employment policies of universities. Pooling 
repeated observations on the same organizations violate the assumption of independence 
of observations, resulting in autocorrelation in the residuals. First-order autocorrelation 
occurs when the disturbances in one time period are correlated with those in the 
previous time period, resulting in incorrect variance estimates, rendering ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates inefficient and biased (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, we 
estimate fixed-effects panel data models with robust standard errors to take into account 
the unobserved and constant heterogeneity among the analyzed universities. Also, the 
use of fixed-effects models controls for the potential endogeneity problems that result 
from the correlation between the explanatory variables and the time-invariant 
university-specific unobserved heterogeneity (Greene, 2003).  
To evaluate the role of universities’ employment practices empirically, in the 
first stage analysis we propose a fixed-effects model with the following form: 
2
0 1 2
2
3 4
5
Research
productivity Fixed-term contracts Fixed-term contracts
                     Part-time contracts Part-time contracts
                     Control variables
it it it
it it
it t i itT
  (1) 
 
In equation (1) 
j
 are parameter estimates for the jth independent variable,  is 
the time-invariant fixed effect that controls for unobserved heterogeneity across 
universities (i), and  is the normally distributed error term that varies cross-universities 
and cross-time (t). Control variables include university size, university age, the gender 
distribution of the analyzed universities, the proportion of international co-publications, 
and academic diversification, while T refers to the set of time dummy variables. 
We estimated the Hausman (1978) specification test to further validate the 
appropriateness of the proposed fixed-effects models. Results for model 1 (Hausman 
test: 26.49 and p<1%; 27.29 and p<1%) and model 2 (Hausman test: 18.81 and p<5%; 
38.11 and p<1%) indicate that random effects estimations are not independent of 
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university-specific effects—i.e., regressors are inconsistent—thus confirming that fixed-
effects estimations are consistent and efficient (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Additionally, we propose a second stage analysis to provide further results on 
the relationship between universities’ employment practices and research productivity. 
In this case, we are interested in testing whether growth patterns in research productivity 
are homogeneous across Spanish public universities and across time. We use coefficient 
estimates computed from equation (1) to analyze the trajectories of research 
productivity. Finally, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used for evaluating cross-time 
productivity comparisons. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Regression results 
The findings for the effect of employment practices in Spanish public 
universities on research productivity are presented in this section (Table 2). Model 
specification 1 in Table 2 shows the results for the baseline model estimating research 
productivity as a linear function of the proportion of fixed-term contract researchers and 
part-time faculty. Specification 2 reports the results for the full model that includes the 
linear and quadratic terms for the variables linked to the contract status of faculty. 
To address the threat of collinearity, we computed the average variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for all variables. The average VIF value for model 2 is 7.48, and the only 
VIF values that exceed 10—a generally accepted rule of thumb for assessing 
collinearity—were observed for the variables linked to the part-time faculty. By 
construction these terms are correlated and—even if computationally correct—this 
explains the VIF results (Greene, 2003). We computed VIFs for the variables used in 
model 1, and the resulting average VIF is 1.89 and ranges between 1.24 and 2.62. The 
results for this diagnostic test do not raise collinearity concerns. 
The results of the control variables included in our analysis indicate that, 
throughout the different model specifications applied to our sample, smaller universities 
show higher rates of research productivity. Additionally, and in line with prior work 
(Jonkers & Tijssen, 2008; Ryazanova & McNamara, 2015), the findings reveal that 
research productivity is positively associated with the university’s capacity to develop 
collaborative networks, in our case measured as the rate of international co-publications. 
Concerning the fixed-effects model estimating the linear effect of employment 
practices on subsequent research productivity, results in model 1 of Table 2 show that—
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both for the ratio of total publications by faculty and the ISI publications by faculty—
the variables linked to the type of employment contract (fixed-term and part-time) are 
not statistically significant. 
 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
Additionally, results in model 2 of Table 1 indicate that universities’ HR 
practices linked to the contract relationships with scientists have a non-linear effect on 
publication outcomes. More concretely, the findings reveal an inverse-U shaped 
relationship between the proportion of fixed-term contracts and research productivity. 
This result gives partial support to the study hypothesis. 
To help interpret the results, the quadratic term in model 2 presents only one 
breakpoint which can be derived by differentiating with respect to the proportion of 
fixed-term contracts, that is, 
2%Fixed term contracts %Fixed term contracts/ 2 . By solving the 
latter expression we know that, on average and compared to the proportion of 
permanent faculty, for universities whose proportion of fixed-term scientists is below 
15.27% any increase in the proportion of this type of contracts will translate into a 
greater number of subsequent publications in indexed journals. In the case of the quality 
measure of research productivity—publications in journals indexed in the ISI Web of 
Science—our estimations suggest a positive relationship between the proportion of 
fixed-term contract researchers and subsequent research productivity in universities 
whose proportion of fixed-term contracts is below 17.02%. On contrary, when the 
proportion of fixed-term academics with unprotected contracts is above the estimated 
breakpoints, the positive effects resulting from these researchers’ publication incentives 
vanish. The estimated breakpoints are economically meaningful in that 57% of the 
analyzed universities (27 institutions) report a rate of fixed-term scientists above the 
cut-off point computed for the quantity productivity measure (15.27%). When the 
proposed quality-based research productivity is the dependent variable, the results 
indicate that 19 universities have a proportion of fixed-term contracts above the 
estimated threshold value (17.02%). 
This result points to a paradox in which Spanish universities that adapt their 
employment policy to meet the productivity challenges set in place by reforms are not 
reaching the desired increases in research productivity. The results in Table 2 give 
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support to the argument that flexible and balanced HR management practices are critical 
for enhancing universities’ research productivity. Following the argument by Finegold 
and Frenkel (2006, p. 5), successful management of knowledge-workers result from the 
adoption of an approach that combines ‘attachment to the firm based on intrinsic work 
satisfaction, selection for long-term potential and professional norms for oversight and 
control’. Nevertheless, results also indicate that research productivity in Spanish public 
universities is hampered by negative aspects that characterize fixed-term contracts 
including, for example, job insecurity and a lack of coherent career and professional 
development (Fuller & Unwin, 2010). 
 
5.2 Second stage analysis 
At this point, we are interested in testing whether growth patterns in research 
productivity are homogeneous across the analyzed universities or, to the contrary, 
whether some universities effectively capitalize on their fixed-term researchers and 
achieve greater rates of research productivity over time. To achieve this objective, we 
carried out further analyses to explore the relationship between research productivity 
and universities’ employment practices. 
First, Figure 3 provides the estimated trajectories for the quantity- and quality-
oriented research productivity measures, based on the coefficients of the linear and 
quadratic terms of the proportion of fixed-term contracts and at sample mean values of 
all other independent variables. The estimated trajectories of the two measures of 
research productivity are consistent with the view that—regardless of the university 
size, age, gender configuration, international collaborations and academic 
diversification—research productivity on average grows over time. Additionally, the 
estimated levels of research productivity are concave with respect to the universities’ 
rate of fixed-term contract researchers. 
 
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
 
Second, we evaluate the changes in research productivity and—for analytical 
purposes—we split the analyzed period in two sub-periods (2002-2004 and 2006-2008). 
We evaluate the research productivity of universities according to their level of fixed-
term contracts and we distinguish between universities whose proportion of fixed-term 
contracts is below and above the cut-off points estimated from the regression analysis in 
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Table 2 (quantity-based scientific productivity: 15.27%, quality-based scientific 
productivity: 17.02%). Table 3 shows the median level of research productivity and the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used for the cross-time comparisons. 
Results in Table 3 for the full sample (Panel A) indicate that research 
productivity grows over the analyzed period. Prior studies report that bibliometric 
measures of productivity increase over time (Balsmeier & Pellens, 2014; Lissoni et al., 
2011). The reported growth in research productivity is in line with the descriptive 
statistics (Figure 2) and the regression results (Table 2), thus confirming that this is the 
case in our data for both quantity and quality dimensions of research productivity. 
In the case of the quantity-oriented measure (publications indexed in SCOPUS 
per full-time faculty), the median level of research productivity significantly increased 
from 0.8841 (2002-2004) to 1.0756 (2006-2008) and 42 out of the 47 analyzed public 
universities improved their results. Similar findings are reported for the quality-oriented 
measure of productivity—publications indexed in the ISI web of Science per full-time 
faculty—which improved from 0.4523 (2002-2004) to 0.5313 (2006-2008). 
Notwithstanding the improvements in research productivity, it should be noted that HR 
employment practices of universities drastically changed and the median rate of fixed-
term contracts increased more rapidly than research productivity (from 12.26% in the 
sub-period 2002-2004 to 22.88% in the sub-period 2006-2008). 
 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
 
Results in Panel B of Table 3 show, for universities with a rate of fixed-term 
contracts below the cut-off points computed from regression estimates, the median level 
of fixed-term contracts and research productivity; while Panel C presents the median 
values of fixed-term contracts and research productivity for universities whose rate of 
fixed-term contracts is above the estimated cut-off points. The results in Panel B 
indicate that all universities with low levels of fixed-term contracts significantly 
improved their productivity results between the analyzed sub-periods (quantity-based 
productivity: 27.96% and quantity-based productivity: 29.84%). When the quantity-
based productivity measure is analyzed, the rate of fixed-term contracts increased up to 
a median value of 12.88% among universities with a rate of fixed-term contracts below 
the estimated cut-off point, while in the case of the quality-based productivity variable 
the median rate of fixed-term contracts significantly increased from 21.80% to 24.92%.  
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The comparison of the results in Panel C for both the quantity-based and the 
quality-based productivity reveals a drastic change in the evolution of research 
productivity. Among universities with an above-the-median level of quantity-based 
research productivity the rate of fixed-term contracts grew 14.30% during the analyzed 
period (from 21.80% to 24.92%), while research productivity only improved 0.82%. For 
the quality-based productivity measure, results show that the rate of fixed-term contracts 
remained practically unchanged among universities whose rate of fixed-term contracts 
is above the estimated cut-off point (from 25.92% to 25.68%); however, their median 
level of research productivity decreased 8.38% (from 0.5714 to 0.5235). 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We conducted two additional analyses to further verify the robustness of our 
results. The first robustness test evaluates the validity of the proposed measure of 
research productivity. In our analysis we argue that scientists do not control publication 
timing and their research productivity does not follow the exploitation of their 
knowledge. To further control for the time-varying relationship between knowledge 
work and publication outcomes, we computed an alternative measure of research 
productivity that includes papers published in the two periods following each of the 
analyzed years (period t+1 and t+2).
5
 Fixed-effects regression models were estimated 
based on equation (1) and results for this supplementary analysis, not presented due to 
space limitations but available on request, indicate that subsequent research productivity 
is not related to universities’ HR employment policy in a significant way. 
The second robustness test deals with the relationship between HR employment 
practices and research productivity. Having confirmed the non-linear (inverse U-
shaped) effect of universities’ HR contract policies on research productivity, one would 
be tempted to consider additional effects. Therefore, we computed the cubic term of the 
variables linked to the fixed-term and part-time contracts to test whether the relationship 
between HR employment practices and research productivity is S-shaped. The results, 
not presented but available from the authors on request, show that the linear coefficient 
for the variable ‘fixed-term contracts’ is positive and significant (p-value = 0.052), 
while the squared (p-value = 0.997) and cubic (p-value = 0.243) terms are not 
                                                 
5 Note that papers published in period t are not included in the computation of the research productivity 
variable to avoid ‘double-counting’ problems resulting from the overlapping of time periods. 
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statistically significant. Once more, these results corroborate both the appropriateness of 
our estimation strategy to analyze research productivity and the validity of our findings. 
 
6. Discussion 
In the increasingly competitive arena of higher education, universities are 
adopting different strategies to enhance their research productivity levels (Sousa, de 
Nijs & Hendricks, 2010). Although the debate on what constitutes research performance 
is open (see, e.g., Aguinis et al., 2014), universities are progressively using research 
productivity variables based on publication metrics to both signal the quality of their 
research and position themselves in the industry (Lissoni et al., 2011; Lutter & 
Schröder, 2016). In a scenario where fixed-term scientists tend to cater to the tastes of 
universities, the analysis of how HR employment policies affect universities’ research 
productivity gains relevance. 
As in many European countries (Lissoni et al., 2011), Spanish universities use 
fixed-term contracts to attract young and promising researchers on the basis that some 
characteristics of this contract (flexibility and increased mobility) positively impact 
research productivity by offsetting the effects of academic inbreeding (Ackers & Oliver, 
2007; Horta et al., 2010). Yet, studies on HR management show that the short-termism 
and high turnover rates linked to this type of contract may increase job insecurity, which 
translates in lower research productivity (Harney et al., 2014; Metcalf et al., 2005). 
It was found a non-linear relationship between the rate of fixed-term contracts 
and university research productivity. These results support that contract practices shape 
research productivity, and that the sign of this relationship is determined by the intensity 
with which universities use fixed-term contracts. In our interpretation, HR practices 
based on fixed-term contracts are conducive to productivity; but, some aspects of this 
contract foreshadow declining research productivity. This suggests that the relationship 
between universities and fixed-term scientists is governed by practices that not always 
match the characteristics of the knowledge of scientists (Kang et al., 2007). 
Models on the HR practices of knowledge-intensive businesses mostly underline 
the role of core employees as reference group on the basis that their superior knowledge 
has the greatest impact on business performance (Lepak & Snell, 2002). But, our results 
suggest that, given their value-creating potential, the reference groups upon which 
universities’ HR practices should focus are scientists with both permanent and fixed-
term contracts. Therefore, to be sure that research productivity reaches its full potential, 
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flexible and balanced HR employment practices that harmonize knowledge properties 
and the scientists’ contract status are needed (Kang et al., 2007). 
Universities choose scientists to maximize scientific outcomes and knowledge 
exploitation plays a critical role in the equation of research productivity (Agarwal & 
Ohyama, 2014). The results suggest that the excessive use of fixed-term contracts may 
deteriorate research productivity. Although universities promote knowledge-sharing 
practices—e.g., internal collaborations—to enhance their productivity levels (Boardman 
& Corley, 2008; Ryazanova & McNamara, 2015), our results for universities with high 
rates of fixed-term scientists are more in line with prior studies stressing that differences 
in the contract status may fracture the organizational climate which is critical for 
knowledge generation processes (Collins & Smith, 2006; Harney et al., 2014). 
Notwithstanding the value and research potential of the knowledge of fixed-term 
scientists, their uncertain professional development may well result not only from the 
short-term and unprotected conditions of their contracts (Harney et al., 2014), but also 
from obscure opportunities for advancement linked to a short-term contract employment 
policy which, in our view, materializes in high rates of fixed-term contracts. Our results 
pointing to a negative relationship between fixed-term contracts and research 
productivity in universities with high rates of fixed-term scientists are in line with this 
intuition. Low promotion opportunities exacerbated by HR practices that saturate 
universities with fixed-term scientists are detrimental to research productivity by 
increasing the number of fixed-term scientists who search for a more stable job in the 
industry (Agarwal & Ohyama, 2014; Hall et al., 2007). 
Research productivity is the observable outcome of scientists’ efforts, and from 
our results we conclude that universities’ HR contract practices should accommodate 
the scientists’ interests if the knowledge generation process that precedes research 
productivity is to work. 
 
7. Concluding remarks, implications and directions for future research 
In this study, we proposed that contractual employment practices impact 
universities’ research productivity. Furthermore, we argued that the publication 
incentives of fixed-term scientists, along with differences in investments in knowledge 
workers within academia have implications for the research productivity of universities. 
Our approach offers a compelling vision of how universities seek to enhance their 
research productivity through HR employment practices which, in turn, might generate 
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unintended negative effects on both researchers’ career development and universities’ 
research productivity levels. 
Overall, the findings are consistent with prior studies that emphasize that fixed-
term contracts contribute to reduce the potentially negative effects of academic 
inbreeding on research productivity (Horta et al., 2010; Song et al., 2003). Nevertheless, 
we find that the excessive use of fixed-term contracts by universities is associated with 
declining research productivity (Fuller & Unwin, 2010; Harney et al., 2014). 
The findings of this study have relevant policy implications. Reforms in the 
Spain’s higher education system aimed at creating the conditions for enhancing 
universities’ productivity via the hiring of young and promising researchers with a 
fixed-term contract. Within academia, this notion is in line with the primary focus on 
research productivity which is fueled by reward structures that promote non-pecuniary 
motives such as priority of discovery, recognition of merits, and reputation (Agarwal & 
Ohyama, 2014). In this scenario, this logic suggests that the brightest and top fixed-term 
researchers will move up to a permanent position within the university, provided that 
their research merits are accredited. Nevertheless, increased use of fixed-term contracts 
may create an uncertain work environment that undermines researchers’ publication 
incentives, and this may translate into lower rates of scientific productivity, in terms of 
creation and dissemination of knowledge outputs. 
In general, higher education institutions lag behind the adoption of effective 
strategies to retain their knowledge workers (Sousa et al., 2010). While fixed-term 
contracts might prove themselves a useful tool to enhance universities’ publication 
outcomes and mobility is an important aspect for the development of researchers’ 
careers, in the long-term the adoption of this contractual strategy can make universities 
to fall into a ‘catch 22’ loop characterized by unattractive career dynamics for young 
scientists, thus threatening universities’ efforts to enhance their research productivity 
through HR contract strategies focused on the use of fixed-term contracts. 
Our results suggest that the development of a HR contract policy based on fixed-
term contracts is infiltrating into Spanish universities. Additionally, the analysis of the 
productivity trajectories of Spanish universities shows that this contractual strategy 
might limit the universities’ capacity to capitalize on their knowledge workers. 
Therefore, the large budget lines invested by public administrations in universities and 
research centers should be coupled with appropriate workforce policies so that these 
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investments do not turn into the sponsorship of institutions that offer unattractive 
academic careers. 
It must, however, be mentioned a series of limitations to the present study that, 
in turn, represent avenues for future research. First, underlying our analysis of research 
productivity is the assumption that publications are the desirable output for scientists. 
Although research productivity is an important dimension of the scientific productivity 
construct, the channels used to disseminate research outputs vary across disciplines. 
Following Aguinis et al. (2014) and Ryazanova and McNamara (2015), future work 
should adopt a more pluralist approach to university productivity by taking into account 
the different outlets through which scientists communicate their findings. 
Second, like other studies on research productivity (see, e.g., Lutter & Schröder, 
2016; Quimbo & Sulabo, 2014), the data do not permit the direct analysis of the 
underlying knowledge generation process. We present various interpretations of how 
research productivity is conditioned by universities’ contractual practices; however, we 
do not evaluate how productivity varies at different stages of the researchers’ contract, 
nor do we assess the processes through which researchers generate—individually or 
collectively—publications. Further research on this issue would be valuable. For 
example, future studies should evaluate the researchers’ response to new recruitments 
by universities, and determine whether academics at early stages of their contract 
publish more than researchers in the last contract year. 
Third, and in line with our previous comment, differences in publication 
incentives between (and within) fixed-term and permanent scientists might result in 
productivity differentials between (and within) the two, which would contribute to 
further explain productivity gaps across universities. In contexts, such as universities, 
where income is mostly invariant with performance, Nickerson and Zenger (2008) 
comment that peer envy resulting from discontent employees and adverse work 
environmental conditions might trigger uncooperative behaviors. Future studies should 
corroborate if this argument holds for fixed-term scientists. From a HR management 
perspective, specifically designed future research can address this point by evaluating 
the potential effect of cooperation and peer envy on research productivity. Finally, 
cultural contexts, different regulatory frameworks, and variations in the flexibility and 
development of job markets might affect the impact of contract employment policies on 
research productivity. The geographic specificity of the study calls for obvious caution 
when interpreting and generalizing its findings. 
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Figure 1. Changes in the regulatory framework of the Spanish University system 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of fixed-term contracts and research productivity of Spanish 
universities (period 2002-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure 3. Estimated research productivity and fixed-term contracts (period 2002-2008) 
 
Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the selected variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Total number of publications / faculty 1.0783 0.4569 0.2649 3.1305 
ISI publications / faculty 0.5271 0.2476 0.0503 1.6760 
Proportion of permanent contracts 0.5578 0.1080 0.2175 0.7815 
Proportion of fixed-term contracts 0.0867 0.0695 0.0000 0.3179 
Proportion of part-time contracts 0.3555 0.1062 0.1180 0.7487 
Total faculty 1924.70 1219.29 419.00 6249.00 
University age (years) 129.62 219.17 4.00 790.00 
Educational scope (Herfindahl index
-1
) 3.8419 0.8672 1.3680 4.8763 
Proportion of publications with 
international collaboration 
0.3394 0.0684 0.2000 0.5361 
Proportion of men: Permanent faculty 0.6757 0.0560 0.5573 0.8624 
Proportion of men: Fixed-term faculty 0.4899 0.1613 0.0000 1.0000 
Proportion of men: Part-time faculty 0.6608 0.0954 0.0000 0.8966 
Sample size: 47 universities (188 observations during 2002-2008). 
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Table 2. Fixed-effects results: The relationship between research productivity and 
universities’ HR employment practices 
 
Research productivity  
(total publications / faculty) 
Research productivity  
(ISI publications / faculty) 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Proportion of fixed-term 
contracts 
0.3219 
(0.4962) 
0.5294* 
(0.4022) 
0.0209 
(0.2196) 
0.6309** 
(0.2460) 
Proportion of fixed-term 
contracts (square term) 
 
–2.3876** 
(1.0940) 
 
–1.8534*** 
(0.6046) 
Proportion of part time 
contracts 
2.3646 
(1.5710) 
1.1722 
(0.9350) 
1.2187 
(1.0779) 
0.8190 
(0.5362) 
Proportion of part time 
contracts (square term) 
 
2.3405 
(2.0001) 
 
1.0185 
(1.1462) 
Size (ln total faculty) 
–0.6828** 
(0.2834) 
–0.9740*** 
(0.3312) 
–0.4035** 
(0.1943) 
–0.6714*** 
(0.1789) 
Age (ln university age) 
0.2451 
(0.2158) 
0.2718 
(0.2227) 
0.0899 
(0.1034) 
0.1068 
(0.1066) 
Educational scope 
(Herfindahl index
-1
) 
0.0696 
(0.0689) 
0.0429 
(0.0658) 
0.0558 
(0.0419) 
0.0308 
(0.0348) 
Publications with 
international collaboration 
0.7093* 
(0.4497) 
0.7361* 
(0.4318) 
0.1164* 
(0.0651) 
0.1318* 
(0.0742) 
Proportion of men: 
Permanent faculty 
1.1362 
(1.5476) 
0.1553 
(1.1375) 
0.6385 
(0.9828) 
–0.1067 
(0.6808) 
Proportion of men:  
Fixed-term faculty 
0.0283 
(0.0871) 
0.0681 
(0.0898) 
0.0250 
(0.0381) 
0.0540 
(0.0392) 
Proportion of men:  
Part-time faculty 
–0.3817 
(0.2867) 
0.0197 
(0.2439) 
0.1889 
(0.1135) 
0.0615 
(0.1411) 
Year 2002 
–0.5462*** 
(0.0994) 
–0.5617*** 
(0.1007) 
–0.3017*** 
(0.0497) 
–0.3229*** 
(0.0435) 
Year 2004 
–0.3377*** 
(0.0817) 
–0.3323*** 
(0.0828) 
–0.2154*** 
(0.0305) 
–0.2174*** 
(0.0262) 
Year 2006 
–0.1725*** 
(0.0316) 
–0.1629*** 
(0.0318) 
–0.1164*** 
(0.0166) 
–0.1140*** 
(0.0149) 
Intercept 
3.5652** 
(1.5176) 
6.2210*** 
(1.8794) 
2.3320* 
(1.2411) 
4.6631*** 
(1.1005) 
F test 16.41*** 15.28*** 13.05*** 13.01*** 
R2 (within) 0.6780 0.6925 0.6589 0.6959 
Average VIF 1.89 7.48 1.89 7.48 
Hausman test 26.49*** 18.81** 27.29*** 38.11*** 
Observations 188 188 188 188 
Robust standard error is presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3. Changes in research productivity 
 
Research productivity  
(total publications/ faculty) 
Research productivity  
(ISI publications/ faculty) 
 2002-2004 2006-2008 2002-2004 2006-2008 
Panel A: Full sample     
Research productivity 0.8841 1.0756 0.4523 0.5313 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Z-value: 5.884*** 
(42 : 5) 
Z-value: 5.503*** 
(41 : 6) 
Observations 47 47 
Panel B: % of fixed-terms below the predicted cut-off   
Rate of fixed-term contracts 8.97% 12.88% 9.36% 14.61% 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Z-value: 3.984*** 
(19 : 1) 
Z-value: 4.418*** 
(27 : 1) 
Research productivity 0.8144 1.0421 0.4253 0.5522 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Z-value: 4.197*** 
(20 : 0) 
Z-value: 4.623*** 
(28 : 0) 
Observations 20 28 
Panel C: % of fixed-terms above the predicted cut-off   
Rate of fixed-term contracts 21.80% 24.92% 25.92% 25.68% 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Z-value: 4.171*** 
(25 : 2) 
Z-value: 3.662*** 
(17 : 2) 
Research productivity 1.0971 1.1061 0.5714 0.5235 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Z-value: 2.057** 
(22 : 5) 
Z-value: 1.932* 
(13 : 6) 
Observations 27 19 
The table reports median values for the proportion of fixed-term contracts and research productivity. The 
predicted cut-off points are obtained from coefficients in Table 2 (total publications / faculty: 15.27% and 
publications in ISI journals / faculty: 17.02%). Values in brackets refer to the number of universities with 
positive and negative changes in the focal variable between the two analyzed sub-periods (2002-2004 and 
2006-2008). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
